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Absenteeism and Overtime 
Double Jeopardy 
A. Mikalachki 
and 
D. C. Chapple 
This study investigated factors leading to absenteeism 
in a large auto plant employing about 1,000 workers. The 
hypothèses examined dealt with the effect on absenteeism 
of: the skill required for the job, the worker's âge and health, 
and the base pay rate. The initial analysis proved opposite 
ofwhat is usually found. An additional factor was examined: 
the ability of the worker to control the amount of overtime 
he worked. The data then showed that the worker who is 
able to achieve a set income for the fewest days in attendance 
by working overtime, uses this device to spend less time on 
the job. Ideas were also presented to show that positive 
reinforcement of good attendance can resuit in decreased 
absenteeism. 
It is always somewhat baffling, albeit exciting, to discover that 
one's research findings are in opposition to previous research results. 
Such was the position we found ourselves in after doing a literature 
survey of absenteeism followed by a study based on company records 
of automobile plant workers. Our sample consisted of 1024 maie 
employées whose âges ranged from eighteen to sixty-seven. 
Our initial results indicated that certain variables long-held to be 
déterminants of absenteeism did not correlate as expected. In some 
cases, the results proved to be the opposite of what was expected. 
Re-examination of our data from a différent viewpoint led us to the 
discovery that one parameter dominated ail the others, thus changing 
the form of absenteeism. This 
overriding parameter is overtime; 
more specifically it is the worker's 
ability to control the amount of 
overtime he works. 
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Absenteeism has been defined as «one symptom of the individual's 
total adjustment to the job situation» (Yolles et. al., 1975, p. 2). It 
can further be classified as excused or unexcused ; however, it is com-
monly understood as unexcused, meaning that the worker does not 
attend work and does not give prior notice to his supervisor. This paper 
reports on the factors affecting unexcused absenteeism, hereafter 
referred to as absenteeism. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In today's industrial organizations, absenteeism is commanding the 
attention of ail management levels. A récent study estimated the costs 
of absenteeism to be between $110 and $300 per employée per year 
(Johnson and Peterson, 1975). Another study estimated the costs to 
increase at the rate of $150,000 per year for each percentage increase 
in the absentée rate in a plant of 1,000 employées (Hawk, 1976). Thèse 
costs are constantly rising due to the effect of inflation and increasingly-
generous benefit plans. The cost of absenteeism is a function of lost 
productivity, the hiring of extra help, the training of extra help, over-
time, fringe benefit plans and loss of sales and profits (Hawk, 1976; 
Shore, September, 1975). 
The factors affecting absenteeism can be grouped under three 
broad headings (Yolles et. al., 1975): the environment, the organization 
and the individual. 
The Environment 
Of the three factors, the environment is probably the most im-
portant. Absenteeism is significantly affected by society's attitudes 
towards work. Over the past two décades, absenteeism has increased 
due to such attitudinal changes as the growing importance of the indi-
vidual in contrast to work, the increasing amount of emphasis on 
leisure time and activities and the increasingly-pervasive value of 
«to get more for less» (Yolles et. al., 1975). 
Work is viewed as a means to an end rather than an end it itself. 
Work is only one of many ways in which the individual's ego can be 
expressed (Yolles et al., 1975). In conjunction with the relatively 
declining value of work, leisure time activities grow in importance. The 
do-it-yourself vogue and the upsurge in sporting and camping activities 
attest to the growing importance of non-work activities which are 
socially-approved and ego satisyfing. Success in non-work activities 
534 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 32, NO 4 
has become increasingly more important than success at work (Yolles 
et. al., 1975). 
The attitude to get more for less is affecting the work place and 
contributing to absenteism. Contract negotiations will reflect this atti-
tude in that fringe benefits are gaining increasing importance, as are 
demands for increased paid vacations, a shorter work week, longer 
coffee breaks, guaranteed sick leave and the like. The demands are 
supported by society's belief that the worker has an inaliénable right 
to get more for less. 
The reduced value of work, the increased value of leisure time 
and activities and the belief that the worker is owed something reflect 
an anti-work environment (Yolles et. al., 1975). Absenteeism is accept-
ed and even expected by North American society. 
The Organization 
Organizational variables such as size, job content and relations, 
and reward System affect absenteeism. Studies hâve shown that as 
organizational size increases, absenteeism also increases (Ingham, 1970). 
Much has been written about job content and relations. Workers 
need challenging tasks to maintain interest in their work and thus be 
induced to avoid absenteeism. The more boring, répétitive and machine-
paced the tasks, the greater is the job dissatisfaction and absenteeism 
(Beatty 1975; Ingham, 1970; Legge, 1974 and 1975; Shore, October 
1975; Mikalachki, 1975; and Herzberg, 1966). In addition to challenging 
tasks, workers demand greater participation in décisions which affect 
them. Participation in decision-making results in récognition for the 
worker and a feeling of personal worth and self respect on the job. 
Thus worker récognition leads to job satisfaction and reduced absen-
teeism (Yolles et. al., 1975). 
Being well-integrated in his work environment also leads the 
worker to work satisfaction. Open communications with supervisors and 
peers can resuit in job satisfaction and group cohésion both of which 
contribute to reduced absenteeism (Mikalachki 1969; Ingham, 1970; 
and Hawk, 1976). 
The organization also provides économie rewards which signif-
icantly affect absenteeism. Thèse rewards take the form of wages and 
fringe benefits. They are futher augmented for absent employées by 
unemployment insurance, supplementary unemployment benefits, health 
and sickness insurance and workmen's compensation payments. Eco-
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nomic rewards affect absenteeism positively and negatively. On the one 
hand, as rewards for attending work, such as hourly pay increase, 
and each day means a greater loss in earnings, absenteeism will de-
crease (Ingham, 1970). On the other hand, as the rewards for not 
attending work, such as health and sickness benefits, increase, the 
employée is encouraged to be absent (The Economist, August, 1976). 
The Individual 
The social conditioning, the physical and mental stress encounter-
ed and the financial independence of the individual affect his absentee-
ism. In terms of social conditioning, âge and éducation are related to 
absenteeism. The greater the worker's éducation (Shore, September, 
1975) and the younger his âge (Beatty, 1975, Yolles et. al., 1975), the 
greater the absenteeism. It would appear that younger, more educated 
workers develop values which reflect negatively on work (see above, 
leisure time activities). 
Physical and mental stress also affect absenteeism. The indi-
vidual's home life and living style is often reflected on the job. Such 
issues as family conflict, leisure activities, moonlighting, alcohol and 
drug abuse will affect attendance patterns (Beatty, 1975). In addition, 
the physical health of the worker has an obvious inverse relation to 
absenteeism (Johnson, and Peterson, 1975; Yolles et. al., 1975). More 
specifically, females are found to expérience greater health problems, 
due in part to menstrual cycles, and consequently are absent more 
often (Hedges, 1975; Yolles et. al., 1975). 
The individual's financial independence affects absenteeism. 
Individuals in desperate need of the financial rewards accruing from 
the job exhibit low absenteeism. Those with greater financial inde-
pendence hâve considerably higher absenteeism (Yolles et. al., 1975). 
Figure 1 diagrammatically represents the configuration of indi-
vidual, organizational and environmental interrelations which affect 
absenteeism. It essentially points out that young, educated workers 
who want more for less, who expérience mental and physical stress, 
who are financially secure and rewarded for absence through auxiliary 
payments, and who expérience boring jobs and poor management and 
peer relations will tend to be absent. 
536 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 32, NO 4 
FOCUS OF EMPIRICAL STUDY 
To add to the literature survey, we conducted an empirial study 
of absenteeism in a large automobile plant employing about 1,000 work-
ers. The minimum estimated cost of absenteeism in this plant is over 
$680,000 per year; a more realistic estimate, including inefficiencies 
and opportunity costs, would be in excess of $1 million. 
During the time of the study, the company was in protracted 
contract negotiations. The délicate nature of negotiations resulted in 
managements not allowing the authors to conduct interviews with plant 
workers. Consequently, the study was restricted to record card infor-
mation. 1 
FIGURE 1 
Factors Affecting Absenteeism 
ENVIRONMENT 
r~l. Societal Values 
• ( - ) toward work 
• (+) toward leisure 
• get-more-for-less 
attitude 
2. Size 
• large organizations 
The study's gênerai focus was to gather more information on the 
factors contributing to absenteeism. More specifically the following 
hypothèses were investigated : 
(i) The greater the skill required in the job, the lower the absenteeism. 
(Ingham, 1970; Mikalachki, 1975, Herzberg, 1966, Beatty, 1975; 
Shore, October, 1975). 
1
 This information was augmented by the intimate knowledge of the plant 
possessed by one of the authors who worked there for six years. 
INDIVIDUAL 
A 
J\ 
Social Conditioning 
• young 
• educated 
Stress 
• non-work conflicts 
• illness 
Financial Security 
1 Absenteeism 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
1. Job Content And Relations 
• boring jobs 
• poor relations with 
managers and peers 
2. Economie Rewards 
• pay for absence 
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(ii) The younger the worker, the higher the absenteeism. (Beatty, 
1975; Yolleset. al., 1975). 
(iii) The better the worker's health, the lower the absenteeism. 
(Johnson and Peterson, 1975; Yolles et. al., 1975). 
(iv) The greater the économie rewards from the job, the lower the 
absenteeism. (Ingham, 1970; Legge, 1974; Legge, 1975). 
The above hypothèses, the gênerai research question of what factors 
contribute to absenteeism, and the limitation of access to only recorded 
data served as parameters for this study. 
FINDINGS 
The data collected and reported upon is for the year 1975. Ab-
sentée rates were calculated by dividing the hours absent by the total 
hours that should hâve been worked and then multipling by 100. Each 
hypothèses will be reported upon. 
Skill Required in Job and Absenteeism 
The skill required in a job was determined by the worker's control 
over his task — does he set the work pace? Is he responsible for 
making important décisions? Thèse skill options are designed into 
jobs. The automobile plant can be classified into three skill groupings: 
Production, Support Staff and Skilled Trades. Thèse groupings can 
easily be ranked according to the degree of skill required. The Pro-
duction group requires the least skill; the work pace is predefined, 
highly répétitive and requires few décisions by the workers. In con-
trast, the Skilled Trades require the most skill. The tasks are man-
paced, continually changing and require fréquent décisions by the work-
ers. The Support Staff ranks somewhere between Production and Skilled 
Trades in terms of skill required. 
Given the hypothèses that the greater the skill required in the job 
content, the lower the absenteeism, it was predicted that the Production 
group would hâve the highest absenteeism and Skilled Trades the 
lowest. Table 1 shows just the reverse. Production has the lowest 
absenteeism rate at 5.20% and Skilled Trades the highest absenteeism 
rate at 7.63%. 
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Age and Absenteeism 
The record cards provided birth dates for plant workers. From 
this raw data, weighted averages for each department were determined 
and then related to the respective absenteeism rates.2 
TABLE 1 
Skill Required in Job Content and Absenteeism 
Department # employées # hrs. 
Worked 
# hrs. 
Absent 
% Absent 
A. Production 
1. Machine Opérations 189 85867 2976 3.35 
2. Machine Opérations 207 94982 4664 4.68 
3. Assembly Room 310 127540 9284 6.78 
Total 706 308389 16924 5.20 
B. Support Staff 
1. Inspection 51 25985 1304 4.78 
2. Janitors 56 24052 1880 7.25 
3. Material Handling 49 21465 1096 4.86 
4. Stores 17 8618 576 6.26 
Total 173 80120 4856 5.72 
C. Skilled Trades 
1. Maintenance 60 27863 2128 7.10 
2. Tool Room 30 13906 1248 8.97 
3. Tool Grinding 25 10826 728 6.30 
4. Machine Repair 30 13671 1376 9.14 
Total 145 66266 5480 7.63 
D. Total Plant 1024 454775 27260 5.66 
Given the hypothesis that the younger the worker, the higher 
the absenteeism, Production would hâve the greatest absenteeism and 
Support Staff and Skilled Trades the least (Table 2). This is not borne 
out by the data. Production has the least absenteeism at 5.20% follow-
ed by Support Staff at 5.72% and Skilled Trades at 7.63%. 
Health and Absenteeism 
Data regarding health is very difficult to obtain. After many false 
starts, we determined health by the number of visits made to First 
Aid, the assumption being that the poorer the worker's health the 
2
 Individual corrélations were not made because of the difficulty of obtaining 
individual absenteeism data. Absenteeism data is recorded by department. The task 
of breaking it down to individual workers was prohibitive. 
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more fréquent the visits. A weighted average for such visits was 
calculated and then related to absenteeism (Table 3). 
Given the hypothèses that the better the worker's health, the 
lower the absenteeism, Support Staff should hâve the least absenteeism 
and Production the most. The data shows that Skilled Trades hâve the 
most absenteeism at 7.63% and Production the least absenteeism at 
5.20%. 
TABLE 2 
Age and Absenteeism 
Department # Employées Absent 
Rate 
(%) 
Average 
Age 
A. Production 
1. Machine Opérations 189 3.35 44.9 
2. Machine Opérations 207 4.68 41.5 
3. Assembly Room 310 6.78 34.6 
Total 706 5.20 39.7 
B. Support Staff 
1. Inspection 51 4.78 45.7 
2. Janitors 56 7.25 42.7 
3. Material Handling 49 4.86 49.8 
4. Stores, etc. 17 6.26 49.6 
Total 173 5.72 46.3 
C. Skilled Trades 
1. Maintenance 60 7.10 41.0 
2. Tool Room 30 8.97 45.2 
3. Tool Grinding 25 6.30 52.0 
4. Machine Repair 30 9.14 43.3 
Total 145 7.63 44.2 
D. Total Plant 1024 5.66 41.5 
Economie Rewards and Absenteeism 
Part of the économie rewards are made up of base rates of pay. 
Thèse base rates are determined periodically through contract nego-
tiations between management and the union. A weighted average of 
thèse base rates was calculated for each grouping and related to 
absenteeism rates (Table 4). 
Given the hypothèses that the greater the économie rewards in 
the job, the lower the absenteeism, Skilled Trades should hâve the least 
absenteeism and Support Staff the most. The data shows that Skilled 
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Trades hâve the most absenteeism, 7.63%, and Support Staff the second 
most, 5.72% 
TABLE 3 
Health and Absenteeism 
Department # Employées Absent 7976 
Rate # Visits 
(%) per Person 
A. Production 
1. Machine Opérations 189 3.35 16.68 
2. Machine Opérations 207 4.68 18.87 
3. Assembly Room 310 6.78 22.96 
Total 706 5.20 20.04 
B. Support Staff 
1. Inspection 51 4.78 14.96 
2. Janitors 56 7.25 15.83 
3. Material Handling 49 4.86 13.53 
4. Stores, etc. 17 6.26 11.67 
Total 173 5.72 14.48 
C. Skilled Trades 
1. Maintenance 60 7.10 19.16 
2. Tool Room 30 8.97 17.70 
3. Tool Grinding 25 6.30 13.20 
4. Machine Repair 30 9.14 21.29 
Total 145 7.63 18.20 
D. Total Plant 1024 5.66 18.94 
A RE-EVALUATION 
The fact that none of the hypothèses were supported by the data 
necessitated a re-evaluation. * Hère is where the expérience in the plant 
by one of the authors was most helpful. He felt that the data were 
being contaminated by the économie rewards of overtime available 
to skilled workers. Overtime is paid at a rate of 1 lk times the base 
rate for ail time in excess of 40 hours worked. For Sundays the rate is 
double time. Skilled workers had a major say as to when and how often 
they would work overtime. We felt that the rate of absenteeism for 
skilled workers could be explained by their working overtime in lieu 
of regular hours. If this were so, there would be a corrélation between 
rates of overtime and absenteeism. Overtime was defined as : 
3
 Whenever work groups within departments could be used to correlate to 
absenteeism, the same lack of support was found for the hypothèses. 
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TABLE 4 
Base Rates and Absenteeism 
Department # employées Absent Rate A verage 
(%) Base Rate ($) 
A. Production 
1. Machine Opérations 189 3.35 5.57 
2. Machine Opérations 207 4.68 5.47 
3. Assembly Room 310 6.78 5.44 
Total 706 5.20 5.48 
B. Support Staff 
1. Inspection 51 4.78 5.52 
2. Janitors 56 7.25 5.18 
3. Material Handling 49 4.86 5.45 
4. Stores, etc. 17 6.26 5.43 
Total 173 5.72 5.38 
C. Skilled Trades 
1. Maintenance 60 7.10 6.74 
2. Tool Room 30 8.97 6.93 
3. Tool Grinding 25 6.30 6.82 
4. Machine Repair 30 9.14 6.84 
Total 145 7.63 6.81 
D. Total Plant 1024 5.66 5.65 
number of man hours worked on Saturday and Sunday 
Rate of O.T. = (Number of employées in department) x (8 hours per 
day) x (2 days) 
The overtime was calculated and related to absenteeism (Table 5). 
Given the belief that overtime significantly affects absenteeism, we 
expected that Production would hâve the least absenteeism and Skilled 
Trades the most. The data supported this assumption: Production had 
the least absenteeism, 5.20% and Skilled Trades has the most, 7.63%. 
Has overtime so affected the absenteeism data that it has over-
shadowed the variables of job skill, âge, health and économie rewards? 
To answer this question, we neutralized overtime as a factor by doing 
a sub-analysis of the Production Department. This department is made 
up of 706 employées whose opportunity for overtime is determined by 
their supervisors and the work flows, not by the workers themselves. 
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A review of the Production Department absenteeism data and 
skill required in job content, âge, health and base rates (tables 2, 3, 4, 
and 5) shows : 
(i) The greater the skill required in the job4, the less the absenteeism. 
(ii) The younger the worker, the greater the absenteeism. 
(iii) The greater the visits to first aid (illness), the greater the absentee-
ism. 
(iv) The greater the base rate (économie rewards), the less the ab-
senteeism. 
With the opportunity for worker-determined overtime neutralized, 
the hypothèses guiding this study and documented in the Hterature 
survey were supported. 
TABLE 5 
Overtime and Absenteeism 
Department # employées Absent Rate 
(%) 
O. T. Rate 
A. Production 
1. Machine Opérations 189 3.35 39.01 
2. Machine Opérations 207 4.68 35.98 
3. Assembly Room 310 6.78 18.27 
Total 706 5.20 29.14 
B. Support Staff 
1. Inspection 51 4.78 43.92 
2. Janitors 56 7.25 42.06 
3. Material Handling 49 4.86 37.92 
4. Stores 17 6.26 38.47 
Total 173 5.72 40.72 
C. Skilled Trades 
1. Maintenance 60 7.10 58.94 
2. Tool Room 30 8.97 50.22 
3. Tool Grinding 25 6.30 60.56 
4. Machine Repair 30 9.14 53.19 
Total 145 7.63 56,74 
D. Total Plant 1024 5.66 34.43 
Thus, the most significant finding in this study is the effect of 
overtime on absenteeism. A number of explanations can be made for 
this phenomenon. The one that appears most useful combines societal 
4
 The assembly jobs are less skilled than the machine opérations. 
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values with the opportunity to avoid work at no cost. In a society which 
values work negatively and leisure activities positively, it is not sur-
prising that workers will want to spend the least amount of time on the 
job for a fixed income. By working overtime and taking regular days 
off, the skilled worker achieves the goal of earning a set income for 
the fewest days in attendance. 
This pattern is well-known in other cultures. In Peru, for example, 
a North American manager doubled the agricultural workers' daily 
salaries, believing that it would increase productivity and morale. 
The workers were paid daily, and the resuit of the wage increase was 
that no one showed up for work on Thursday: there was no need, as 
the workers earned the money needed during the first three week 
days. A similar problem occurs in Sweden, where unemployment 
insurance and sick benefits are so generous that at times it is more 
economical to stay home than go to work (The Economiste August 1976). 
It now appears in North America that the worker's aliénation from the 
job, the rewards available even if the worker is absent (overtime) and 
the interest in non-work activities is stimulating absenteeism. 
The second gênerai finding of this study is the incongruence 
between workers' values and organizational demands. Young, educated 
workers do not want to engage in répétitive, machine-paced and non-
involving tasks. Their avoidance of thèse tasks can be as simple as 
going to First Aid (a temporary withdrawal) or as complex as devious 
overtime practices and union pressures for reduced work weeks and 
increased fringe benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the major problems facing managers is to détermine how 
absenteeism is reinforced by company and governmental practices. 
Managers dealing with absenteeism should assume that it is a behavior 
that is intensif!ed by either organizational or environmental forces. 
Some managers hâve worked within this assumption and hâve set up 
practices that reinforce attendance (Luthans, 1976), such as: 
(i) Loîtery System : Ail employées with perfect attendance and 
punctuality records receive one chance on a monthly draw of 
$100. In this company, the absenteeism rate decreased 30% in 
less than one year (Johnson and Wallin, 1976). 
(ii) Poker Game : Each departmental employée chooses a single card 
from a deck for each day of the week he arrives on time. Each 
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week, the highest five-card poker hand in each department wins 
$20. In this company, absenteeism dropped from 3.01% to 2.31% 
in just three months (Pedalino and Gambro, 1974). 
(iii) Hat Trick : Names are drawn from a hat-full of ail departmental 
employées' names at the end of each week. The draw continues 
until the name of an employée with a perfect record is drawn. 
That employée receives a $100 award. In several months, ab-
senteeism dropped from 10% to 5% (Financial Post, October 1975). 
Thus, positive reinforcement can significantly affect attendance patterns. 
The négative attitude towards work, coupled with the notion of 
getting more for less is resulting in greater demands for fringe benefits 
from companies, and non-work pay from governments. As well, this 
study has shown that workers who can détermine their own overtime 
sometimes manipulate the situation to obtain more money for less 
regular work. 
Thèse worker attitudes affect organizational efficiency. The 
greater benefits paid out to workers may occur with no increase in 
productivity, with disastrous conséquences for inflation and inter-
national trade. The challenge for managers then, is to détermine and 
eliminate the rewards for absence while developing and instituting 
rewards for attendance. 
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Absentéisme et surtemps 
Une étude récente (Johnson et Peterson, 1975) estime le coût de l'absentéisme 
pour les employeurs entre $110.00 et $300.00 par employé par année. On peut regrouper 
les facteurs qui affectent l'absentéisme sous trois grandes rubriques: l'environnement, 
l'entreprise et l'individu. La valeur positive du travail décline et l'intérêt pour les 
loisirs s'accroît. Le succès dans les activités libres apparaît plus important que le 
succès au travail. Ainsi, il s'est créé une ambiance peu propice au travail. Certaines 
variables à l'intérieur de l'entreprise, comme ses dimensions, le contenu des tâches, 
les relations entre les employés et le régime de rétribution influence l'absentéisme. Il 
en est de même de l'âge de l'employé, de son degré d'instruction et de son condi-
tionnement social. 
Se fondant sur les points précédents et les conclusions inspirées par les études 
sur l'absentéisme, les auteurs ont utilisé les cartes de présence des salariés pour 
formuler les quatre hypothèses suivantes : 
1° Plus la tâche exige de qualifications, moins l'absentéisme est marqué. (Ingham, 
1970; Mikalachki, 1975; Herzberg, 1966; Beatty 1975; Shore, octobre 1975.) 
2° Plus l'employé est jeune, plus l'absentéisme est élevé. (Beatty, 1975; Yolles 
et autres, 1975.) 
3° Plus la tâche est rémunérée, plus l'absentéisme est bas (Ingham, 1970; 
Legge, 1974; Legge 1975.) 
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Les données ne confirment aucune des hypothèses précédentes. 
Celles-ci ont été analysées de nouveau en se fondant sur la variable suivante: 
la possibilité pour l'employé d'exercer un contrôle sur les heures supplémentaires qu'il 
lui est possible d'exécuter. 
Lorsque les travailleurs n'ont que peu à dire en matière d'heures supplémen-
taires, l'hypothèse ci-dessus se vérifie. C'est quand les travailleurs peuvent influencer 
les heures supplémentaires que les données deviennent faussées. 
Le contrôle du travailleur sur les heures supplémentaires exerce un poids consi-
dérable sur l'absentéisme. Dans une société où la valeur du travail décline et où l'inté-
rêt pour les loisirs s'accroît, les travailleurs ne veulent que passer le moins de temps 
possible au travail en vue d'en retirer un revenu fixe. En faisant des heures supplé-
mentaires et en s'absentant les jours de travail régulier, le travailleur atteint le but 
recherché, c'est-à-dire qu'il touche un meilleur revenu pour une période de travail 
plus courte. 
Les chefs d'entreprise, qui ont à affronter le problème de l'absentéisme, recon-
naissent qu'il s'agit là d'une façon d'agir qui est renforcée par l'entreprise elle-même, 
par l'attitude individuelle et par les circonstances ambiantes. Quelques-uns ont compris 
le problème et mis au point des trucs qui raffermissent l'assiduité. En voici quelques-
uns: 
Le système loterie : Tous les employés qui ont un dossier d'assiduité et de 
ponctualité parfait courent la chance d'obtenir une récompense mensuelle de cent 
dollars. Dans cette entreprise, le taux d'absentéisme a baissé de trente pour cent en 
moins d'un an. (Johnson et Wallin, 1976). 
La partie de poker. Chaque employé d'un service choisit une carte dans un 
paquet chaque jour de la semaine, celui qui a la meilleure main dans chaque service 
gagne vingt dollars. Dans cette société, l'absentéisme a baissé de 3.01 à 2.31 pour cent 
en trois mois. (Pedalino et Gambro, 1974). 
Le truc du chapeau. On tire les noms des employés de tous les services à la 
fin de chaque semaine. Le tirage continue jusqu'à ce que l'on tombe sur le nom d'un 
employé dont le dossier est parfait. Cet employé touche cent dollars. En un certain 
nombre de mois, l'absentéisme est tombé de dix à cinq pour cent. (Financial Post, 
octobre 1975). 
Ces méthodes montrent que le renforcement pratique de l'assiduité bien com-
prise peut avoir une influence certaine sur les habitudes de présence et de ponctualité 
au travail. 
